

nored that he misunderstands the very elements of National Socialism. When he speaks of the "broad demands of German contemporary life," from which the basic principles of Nazi education are said to have arisen "as an expression of National Socialist will," he grossly misinterprets the movement as a real mass expression from its very beginnings, whereas after its first rise it gained momentum and came to power by mere force. A facing of realities would have shown the driving forces and real aims of Nazism through their propagandistic disguise. The "land year," for example, extolled in the quotations from Nazi sources, has proved a failure; and as for the "labor service," the fact that at the end of 1939 it became attached to the army shows clearly how much "soldiering" it entailed as compared with labor, which the author states to be a matter of conjecture, and converts into a notable understatement his remark that "it is perhaps not premature to assume that the original aim of 'work service' is giving ground to military preparedness."

The method of quoting mainly National Socialist authorities serves to provide a full record of the movement's educational principles and features, from its own point of view. It is this comprehensive, though onesided, record that gives the book its merit. The systematic bibliography, general and specialized, will be of great value to students of the problems connected with National Socialism, particularly its methods of education.

MAX LEDERER

The Library of Congress

MARCUSE, HERBERT. *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1941. 431 pp. \$3.75.

Marcuse's interpretation of the transition from Hegel to Marx, from "reason" to "revolution," sets out to demonstrate that Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led to fascism; indeed, that fascism and National Socialism have their roots in the positivistic reaction against Hegel, "while Hegel wandered from Marx to Lenin." This apologetic defense against the charge that Hegel prepared the way for the authoritarian state forces Marcuse to take the opposite stand, insisting that Hegel was an anti-fascist who prepared the way for Marx. In order to prove this thesis Marcuse analyzes the foundations of Hegel's philosophy and of Marx's dialectical theory. In both parts the analysis of the concept of labor is paramount. This analysis has the great merit of demonstrating the dynamic concrete-

ness, and even the “materialism” of Hegel’s philosophy, and, on the other hand, the philosophic and even idealistic roots of Marx’s theory. Real Marxism is indeed much more sophisticated than the average Marxist thinks, and real Hegelianism is much more realistic than our neo-Hegelians imagine. I believe that the academic Hegelians as well as the followers of Marx have a great deal to learn from Marcuse’s attempt to integrate the two.

The last part of the book deals with the positivistic reaction in the writings of Saint-Simon, A. Comte, F. J. Stahl and Lorenz von Stein. Despite the differences in their backgrounds and intentions, they all move away from Hegel’s and Marx’s universal and dialectical philosophy toward an undialectical acceptance of the empirical facts, studying the social realities after the pattern of nature and in the aspect of objective necessity, thereby emancipating sociology from philosophy. Philosophy to these men was merely a synopsis of the basic concepts and principles employed in the specialized sciences. “Society became the subject-matter of an independent field of investigation. The social relations and the laws governing them were no longer derived—as they had been in Hegel’s system—from the essence of the individual; still less were they analyzed according to such standards as reason, freedom and right.” The transcendental “absolutism of truth” which demands “negativity” toward given facts is preserved only in Marx, while Comte fought against the French form of critical and negative philosophy, and Stahl against the revolutionary dragon seed of German Hegelianism. Both were influenced by the writers of the counter-revolution, de Maistre and Burke.

I agree with Marcuse’s statement that a “positivistic philosophy” is no philosophy at all, because philosophy is more than a mere synthesis of empirical knowledge, but I disagree with his interpretation of Hegel’s “negativity,” “reason” and “freedom” after the pattern of Marx. It was Marx himself who recognized that Hegel’s later accommodation to the existing order must be understood as a consequence of his principle: to comprehend “what is,” but not to change the world. True, the young Hegel was much more critical than the older one, for he looked forward and thereby negated “what is,” but his concept of negation is not determined by any special reality. Hegel’s concepts have no peculiar understructure at all, but a general structure so formed as to grasp and comprehend all kinds of realities. Hence negation cannot be understood merely by its critical connotation, and with regard to the social and political setting as emphasized by the left-wing Hegelians. While Marx transformed Hegel’s *Aufhebung*—

that is, conservation and at the same time negation—into a simple abolition of the existing contradictions, Hegel never meant that the contradictions between the infinite and the finite, between freedom and destiny, state and society or wealth and poverty could or should be dissolved. What he urges is no more and no less than mastering them through a progressive mediation and reconciliation on higher levels. On the other hand, there was only one “positive” reaction against Hegel’s philosophy as a “negative” one—that of Schelling—which was at the same time philosophical, and cannot be explained simply by the word reactionary. Great philosophers are always revolutionary as well as reactionary, neither merely accepting nor merely rejecting a given state of affairs. For they were never concerned primarily and exclusively with those “facts” by which Marx was so completely obsessed that he could not help negating them.

It is certainly productive to emphasize with Marcuse the historical content in Hegel’s metaphysical terms. But only a man who believes in historical materialism can think that the classic and Christian tradition, as interpreted and consummated in Hegel’s philosophy, can be reduced to the history of middle-class society.

KARL LÖWITZ

Hartford Seminary Foundation

FARBER, MARVIN, ed. *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1940. 332 pp. \$4.

The memorial volume edited with great care and love by Marvin Farber contains contributions from sixteen philosophers and scientists who are anxious to show Husserl’s influence, positive or negative, on their thought.¹ Since for many American scholars Husserl’s thinking is still a blank spot in the polar regions on the map of contemporary philosophy, most of the contributors have felt it necessary first to expound the mainstays of Husserl’s position and only then to indicate their own systematic standpoint. But since their own position cannot but color their idea of Husserl we find almost as many definitions, more or less at variance with one another, of intentionality, ideational intuition, phenomenological *epoché*, transcendental consciousness, as there are contributors: Husserl’s shining light reflected, sometimes bluntly, sometimes brilliantly, in mirrors of all kinds, ranging from materialism (V. J. McGill) to “agapism” (Charles Hartshorne), from

¹ The volume ends with a supplement which contains the first publication of Husserl’s manuscript entitled “Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Natur.”