

absence of causal influence, as there is no way anything could happen or exist except through causal influence. We cannot "free" our will from causation, since we cannot get something out of nothing. But we might free the will more and more from the influence of factors like fear, hatred, prejudice, bigotry, ignorance, selfishness by finding the causal patterns involved, and bringing new causes to bear. We cannot attain a "free" society by denying or ignoring causation, or by just letting things alone, but only by identifying the evils from which we want society free, finding what causes them, and bringing other causes to bear. Thus freedom and causation are by no means opposites. On the contrary, the only kind of freedom that is possible depends on the knowledge of causation. This is the dialectical connection which resolves the seeming paradox in the traditional formulation: freedom is the recognition of necessity.

What Garaudy does, with considerable forcefulness and an abundance of apt documentation, is to show, within each social system, what the concepts of freedom meant in operational terms, not only in the actual patterns of practice crystallized into laws and customs, but as ideological tools and weapons in the struggles of contending groups. Such an approach is peculiarly efficacious in dealing with freedom, which has always been a *fighting* word, and is eminently so today, as witness expressions like "free world" and "free enterprise." The question always is: free from what?

This book manages to overcome better than most Marxist-Leninist works on philosophy the suggestions of stiffness and sectarian rigidity which arise from the custom of multiplying quotations from the same authorities. Still, there is enough of the practice here to make one wish there were less. In spite of this drawback it is a book which ought to be translated into English, because of its documented content and the clarity with which it states its positions.

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Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. HERBERT MARCUSE. Second edition with supplementary chapter. New York, The Humanities Press, 1954. Pp. 440.

The only change in this re-issue of the work originally published in 1941 appears to be an "Epilogue" of seven pages, written in 1954. This supplement comments briefly on the rise and increase of Soviet power, especially since World War II, characterizing what happened in the following terms: "Then the Soviet state grew into a highly rationalized and industrialized society, outside the capitalist world and powerful enough to compete with the latter on its own terms, challenging its monopoly

in progress and its claim to shape the future of civilization. The Western world answered with total mobilization, and it was this mobilization which completed national and international control over the danger zones of society. The Western world was unified to an extent unknown in its long history. . . . Conformity becomes a question of life and death – not only for individuals but also for nations” (p. 439). The statement then ends on the rather ambiguous note: “The total mobilization of society against the ultimate liberation of the individual, which constitutes the historical content of the present period, indicates how real is the possibility of this liberation” (p. 439). It is a pity the supplementary material is not more extensive and of greater clarity.

The body of this book, written originally to defend Hegel from the charge that his work lay at the basis of Fascism and Nazism, has great merits and some weaknesses, especially in relation to readers dependent mainly on English and its associated cultural framework. The author’s survey of the content and significance of the social aspects of Hegel’s whole philosophy, which is the main part of the text, is particularly good. Not only is this survey a valuable contribution by way of summing up the net effects of doctrines scattered through many works over a long period; it has the added merit of connecting the doctrines realistically with the problems created by the movement of political and economic forces in Hegel’s world, problems to which, as Marcuse shows, Hegel responded explicitly and concretely in his work.

While the author rightly selects as one of his significant themes the little explored relations between the work of Marx and Comte, he seems unaware that Comte’s final formulation of the hierarchy of the sciences added morals, and placed it, instead of sociology, at the apex. Thus value judgments not only entered Comte’s “positivism,” but came to play a leading role; contemporary “positivistic” trends are in some ways not only different from but opposite to Comte’s outlook. On the other hand, there is something basically common to Marx, Comte, and post-Comtian positivists the significance of which is underestimated or overlooked by Marcuse – that is, the attempt to reject *a priorism* as thoroughly as possible in favor of scientific methodology. The author seems to think that the Marxists’ polemic against the positivists involved a rejection by the former of empirically grounded methodology, whereas it meant an acceptance of the primacy of the standards of empirical science (with, of course, plenty of disagreement on the nature of the standards), but a rejection of the positivists’ outlook on morals and politics whether of the earlier explicit or later agnostic variety. The author also seems to think that Marx’s rejection of certain socio-economic laws operative under capitalism meant a rejection of the principle of scientific law in social phenomena, whereas Marx accepted and emphasized the view

that social phenomena as well as natural phenomena happen in accordance with laws which can be discovered and utilized. What he rejected was the view that because certain effects were inevitable under capitalism they would be inevitable under any economic system. A scientific law is a statement of what happens under specified conditions, not under any conditions.

In spite of such shortcomings as this book may possess, it throws valuable light on many thorny problems of great theoretical importance and considerable practical urgency.

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Conceptual Thinking, A Logical Inquiry. STEPHAN KÖRNER. Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp. viii, 301.

Mr. Körner elaborates the logical structure of ostensive concepts in order thereby to clarify or solve some of the more persistent philosophical problems. He considers, e.g., the nature of synthetic *a priori*, logically necessary, and general propositions; and investigates the distinction between "comprehension" and "denotation," the logical paradoxes, the "laws" of contradiction and excluded middle, definition, validity, and logical form, empirical laws, conventionalism, and how mathematics applies to experience — all in the first part of his tripartite work.

Körner's analysis of empirical laws will serve as a good model of his way of analysis. The main obstacle in the way of reaching clarity about empirical laws, he writes, is to do justice at once to their empirical and their hypothetical character. To qualify as an empirical law, a universal statement must (1) assert a relation between two concepts and not only apply two concepts to the same base ("to state an empirical law of nature is more than to state a coincidence, even if the number of cases in which the coincidence has been observed is very great"); (2) have its protasis and apodosis consist of ostensive concepts; (3) be a hypothetical proposition (in the sense in which some writers speak of counterfactual or contrafactual propositions); (4) be empirical in the sense of "not transcending possible experience"; (5) entitle us to infer from unobserved instances of its protasis unobserved instances of its apodosis. To interpret an empirical law as a Russellian formal implication of order zero is inadequate, Körner thinks, because it does not take into account, at the least, number (3). To interpret an empirical law as an entailment, on the other hand, is inadequate because it does not account, at the least, for number (4). The trouble with both theories, Körner thinks, stems from not understanding the logic of ostensive concepts, *which is not Boolean in nature*. Ostensive concepts exhibit at least these *exact* logical relations: inclusion,